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tografica etc.,13 decided by the Court a month after the Exercycle case. In the
DeLaurentiis case, petitioner, seeking a stay of arbitration, contended that a
contract between himself, a film distributor, and an author for production and
distribution of a film, leaving to future agreement approval of a story outline
and scenario, was illusory; therefore, he was not bound by the arbitration
agreement embodied in the allegedly invalid contract. The Court, citing the
Exercycle case, held that "it is for the arbitrators to decide what, under all
the circumstances, these covenants contemplated .... ,,14
Although the Court has recognized that they are bound by their decision
in Exercycle to refer the issue of mutuality to arbitration, it appears that they
are nevertheless deciding that very issue themselves when they state:
Thus, in addition to the implication of good faith read into every
contract (see Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118
N.E. 214), we had an express promise of consultation and of good-
faith effort to bring to completion a scenario of such form and quality
as to be acceptable.15
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court is retreating somewhat from its
position in Exercycle.
Although the DeLaurentiis case leaves us with some doubt as to the
Court's convictions concerning the power of an arbitrator to decide the issue
of mutuality of contract, the Exercycle case is still the law in New York.
Therefore, an attorney faced with a problem concerning the validity of an
arbitration contract must first decide whether his case fits under the factual
pattern of Exercycle (or DeLaurentiis) or the Wolff case, since the answer
will dictate whether a court of law or an arbitrator will decide the issue.
I. D.
ARBITRATOR TO DECIDE EXTENT OF DAMAGES
In DeLaurentiis v. Cinematografica, Etc., 16 petitioner (producer of motion
pictures) and respondents (a film distributor and an author) entered a written
agreement whereby they were to do what was necessary for the production and
distribution of a motion picture. The contract further provided that any dis-
pute arising thereunder should be submitted to arbitration under the rules of
the American Arbitration Association in New York City. Under the agreement,
petitioner covenanted to prepare a story outline and scenario, subject to re-
spondent's approval. Respondents, through their New York agents, alleged
that petitioner had never performed any of his obligations under the contract
and sought arbitration, claiming among other damages, loss of profits and loss
of business reputation. Petitioner's agent wrote a series of letters to respond-
13. 9 N.Y.2d 503, 215 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
14. Id. at 510, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
15. Id. at 509-510, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
16. DeLaurentiis v. Cinematografica, Etc., 9 N.Y.2d 503, 215 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961),
affirming 12 A.D.2d 467, 207 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1960).
78
COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
ent's agents, requesting an extension of time to allow petitioner to decide
whether or not to participate in the arbitration proceedings. Petitioner did not
participate in any arbitration but responded to the demand by initiating the
present action for a stay. He alleged: 1) that the agreement was illusory and
therefore unenforceable; and 2) assuming that the contract was valid, certain
of the claims constituted consequential damages, which are not recoverable in
arbitration.
Special Term denied the motion, finding that petitioner had participated
in the arbitration proceedings by seeking the extensions of time and was there-
fore precluded from contesting the validity of the contract. 17 However, the
Court of Appeals felt that such requests for extensions of time did not consti-
tute "participation" in the arbitration proceeding within the meaning of sub-
division 2 of Section 1458 of the New York Civil Practice Act, as that term
was construed by this Court in In re National Cash Register Co. (Wilson).18
In answer to petitioner's contention that the contract lacked mutuality,
the Court, relying on their ruling in Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta,19 held that
this issue is to be decided by the arbitrators.
Petitioner's second ground for the stay-that respondents sought conse-
quential damages not recoverable under the rule in Marchant v. Mead-Morrison
Mfg. Co.W-was also held to be within the arbitrator's jurisdiction because of
the broad provisions of the arbitration clause.
In the Marchant case, relied on by petitioner, the Court held that the
arbitration clause, by its narrow scope, was not intended to include damages
purely consequential by nature. The Court, however, stated that:
Parties to a contract may agree, if they will, that any and all contro-
versies growing out of it in any way shall be submitted to arbitration.
... A submission so phrased, or in form substantially equivalent,
does not limit the authority of the arbitrators to any adjudication of
the breach. It is authority to assess the damages against the party in
default.21
This writer submits, that in view of the above statement, the Court's
decision in the present case is a sound one. Petitioner, by not performing any
of his obligations under the contract, never allowed the agreement to reach
the point where profits could reasonably be expected. It was his inaction that
prevented the realization of profits. Evidence of his inaction should properly
be put to the arbitrator before the damages sought may be said to be "purely
consequential." This is precisely what the Court has said in the majority
17. DeLaurentiis v. Cinematografica, Etc., 26 Misc. 2d 371, 207 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
18. 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1960). See student note on this case appearing
p. 82 infra.
19. 9 N.Y.2d 329, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961). See student note on this case appearing
p. 75 supra.
20. 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
21. Id. at 298-299, 169 N. E. at 391.
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opinion. They will let the arbitrator decide after hearing all the evidence,
whether respondents seek consequential damages, or whether their claim has
merit.
The DeLiflo Const. Co. v. Lizz & Sons case,2 2 also relied upon by peti-
tioner, dealt with a narrow arbitration clause such as the one found in the
Marchant case and is therefore not applicable here where the clause was deter-
mined to be broad in its scope.
The dissent in the case at bar, relying on the majority's concluding state-
ment,2 3 believes that this decision would bar the court from hearing any motion
to stay an award, claiming the statement makes the decision of the arbitrators
"final and conclusive in any event." However, the majority explicitly stated
that any determination "in advance" of arbitration would be inappropriate.
(Emphasis added.) 24 This leads the writer to the conclusion that where the
arbitration clause is broad enough, the court will allow any claim of damage
to go to the arbitrator, reserving in the parties the availability of Article 84 of
the New York Civil Practice Act to contest the legality of an award in an
appropriate court of law. This is consistent with the wording and intent of the
appropriate Sections of Article 84 (Sections 1462-1462-a). It may also ease
the court's task of determining the validity of an award, because, when an
action would be brought before them under these Sections, it would be after
the arbitrator has heard all the evidence on both sides; and since he usually
is someone familiar with the industry (if not a member of it) his decision
would probably reflect the general attitude of that industry about such dam-
ages, thereby allowing the court to better achieve the intent of the parties
when they entered into the agreement.
J. D.
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BEFORE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IN
VIOLATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
In S. M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff,21 the parties engaged in telephone conver-
sations concerning the purchase of imported horseradish roots. The petitioners
(brokers) thereafter mailed to respondents two "Bought Notes," covering the
purchase in question, which contained broad arbitration clauses. Upon the
arrival of the goods, they were accepted and paid for by respondents. There-
after respondents lodged a preliminary complaint with the United States
Department of Agriculture,2 6 claiming that the shipments failed "to grade
according to contract." After a hearing at which the parties failed to reach a
settlement, respondents lodged a formal complaint with the Department of
22. 7 N.Y.2d 102, 195 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1959).
23. DeLaurentiis v. Cinematografica, Etc., supra note 1 at 510, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
24. Ibid. See Matter of Transpacific Transp. Corp. (Sirena Shipping Co., S.A.), 9
A.D.2d 316, 321, 193 N.Y.S.2d 277, 283 (1st Dep't 1959).
25. 9 N.Y.2d 356, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1961), reversing 11 A.D.2d 656, 203 N.Y.S,2d 1020
(Ist Dep't 1960).
26. Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499(f) (1958).
